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Lilla Farmasi, Attila Kiss, and István Szendi 
The Narrative Facilitation of  Recovery 
The Application of Narrative Theories in a Group Therapy for 
Patients with Schizophrenia1 
The application of narrative theories in non-literary disciplines has become a pop-
ular practice in the last decades. Yet, narratological application in the fields of 
psychology and phenomenological psychiatry usually disregards the findings of 
postclassical theories of narrative. In this essay, we will present a trans-disciplinary 
method for a group therapy for persons with schizophrenia through combining 
the theories of narrative psychology, psychiatry, and postclassical narratology. 
The main techniques to be applied in the therapy concern personal narratives and 
everyday conversations, but we are also interested in narrative intelligence in gen-
eral. In a cooperation between the Department of English and the Department 
of Psychiatry at the University of Szeged we have also carried out a pilot study. 
In this research, we see an opportunity to re-examine concerns of (cognitive) nar-
ratology such as the nature and functions of narrative in human cognition. 
1. Introduction 
This essay introduces a trans-disciplinary method for a group therapy of persons 
with schizophrenia by combining theories of narrative psychology, psychiatry, 
and postclassical narratology. Our work is embedded in a large cross-faculty re-
search project that investigates schizophrenia. We are building our method on 
the assumption that narrating personal experiences has an undeniable therapeu-
tic value and that creating a well-formed personal narrative can be an important 
part of the process of recovery from schizophrenia. 
Our aim is to develop the narrative identity and narrative intelligence of the 
patients through a dynamic restructuring of their life stories. We carried out a 
pilot study where we asked the participants to write short life stories, which they 
had to gradually rewrite during the therapy. In this practice, we conceived of the 
written life stories as representations of the writers’ narrative identities. We fo-
cused on the selection and integration of self-defining memories into the life 
story. However, during the sessions we also focused on several aspects of the 
theory of the dialogical self, and of the formation of narrative identity in oral 
storytelling, which entails a performative, situated practice of identity construc-
tion. Our goal was not simply to recreate the patients’ life stories, but to trans-
form the process of revaluating and rewriting their memories into habit, to help 
them to keep developing their life stories, which are often regarded, in the case 
of people with schizophrenia, as being reduced and rigid. This method resulted 
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in a partly new approach to the experience of the self, which perhaps contributes 
to the process of recovery.  
After outlining some current trends in interdisciplinary narrative studies, we 
will elaborate on our methodology of generating and rewriting representations 
of life stories. Merging contemporary theories of cognitive narratology as well as 
psychology, and investigating narratives produced by people who live with men-
tal illnesses, may permit us to learn more about specific processes of human 
cognition. By focusing on personal stories as well as narrative intelligence in gen-
eral, our work also allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the construction 
of life stories and the nature and functions of narratives in human cognition.  
2. Interdisciplinary Narrative Studies and Current Approaches 
to Life Stories 
Ever since the dawn of French structuralism, the fact that narratives, “like life 
itself”, are everywhere around us (Barthes 1975, 237) has been widely acknowl-
edged. From the perspective of the present essay, Barthes’ famous description 
of narratives is especially significant because, even before narrative theories 
started spreading across the disciplines, it suggested that there is a strong con-
nection between narratives and human lives. Today there is no debate about the 
usefulness of narrative studies in various fields. For decades now, narrative has 
been “emancipated [...] from literature and from fiction, and [has been recog-
nized] as a semiotic phenomenon that transcends disciplines and media” 
(Hyvarinen 2010, 72). The application of narrative theories in non-literary disci-
plines, even in hard sciences such as medicine, has become a popular practice. 
In narrative psychology, narrative has been regarded as a successful tool with 
which we can trace complex psychological processes (László 2008, 301), but, as 
Sandra Heinen has pointed out, narratological application in the fields of psy-
chology and psychiatry usually means borrowing of concepts from structuralist 
narratology (Heinen 2009, 194). The findings of postclassical theories of narra-
tive are rarely applied, and genuine interdisciplinarity is hardly ever observable 
in these endeavours. In fact, other disciplines have developed hypotheses and 
theories about the processes of the production and comprehension of narratives 
often in isolation from narratology. Sometimes the term ‘narrative’ is reduced to 
a mere metaphor (Heinen 2009, 199f.), for instance in psychology, where narra-
tive is not understood as a text type, but essentially as any larger piece of text to 
be analysed, as opposed to materials acquired with the help of tests or other 
experimental methods (Ehmann 2002, 74). Luc Herman et al. stress that “more 
genuine dialogue is needed among story analysts working in different fields” 
(2005, 24). Our research particularly strives to benefit from the cultivation of the 
epistemological marriage of cognitive narratology, narrative psychology, and 
phenomenological psychiatry.  
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Richard Menary proposes that “[i]t is not narratives that shape experiences 
but, rather, experiences that structure narratives” (2008, 79). This view requires 
a revision of the traditional view of narratives. Such a revision has already begun 
in second generation cognitive narratology, which builds its views on second 
generation cognitive science, understands cognition as a dynamic process going 
on in the mind-body-environment system, and imagines narrative structures ac-
cording to this principle. These approaches trace patterns of cognition, which 
include abstract processes as well as emotions, and the workings of the sensory-
perceptual systems. The examination of narratives that include representations 
of cognitive disorders may help us further elaborate on the nature and functions 
of narrative as a cognitive tool.  
Our examination requires the use of interdisciplinary narrative studies.2 Neu-
roscientist Antonio Damasio assumes a firm connection between narratives and 
cognitive processes by claiming that “consciousness begins when brains acquire 
the power, the simple power I must add, of telling a story” (quoted in McAdams 
2008, 244). Capitalizing on such observations, narrative psychology emerged as 
a field in the 1980s. By now, it has exerted significant impact on personality 
psychology, and in fact, as one of narrative psychology’s founding fathers, Dan 
P. McAdams observes, in the “first decade of the 21th century, narrative ap-
proaches to personality have moved to the centre of the discipline” (2008, 242). 
As opposed to narratology, psychology is first and foremost interested in 
content instead of structures, yet there is an approach in psychology that tries to 
understand the patterns and nature of personal stories in general, instead of an-
alysing the stories of individuals. Narrative psychology had assumed that an in-
dividual’s whole life can be viewed as one long story. Based on that metaphorical 
understanding, the term ‘narrative identity’ became equivalent with ‘life story’. 
However, more recent approaches have developed a more complex view on nar-
rative identity.  
Largely inspired by Bakhtin’s analysis of Dostoyevsky’s novels, where he 
works out his idea of polyphony in the novel, the theory of the dialogical self 
was developed in psychology. It assumes that an individual’s self, rather than 
possessing a single, unwavering narrating voice while representing his or her life 
story, “involves open and continuous dialogues between separate elements and 
does not revolve around a conclusive singular or synthetic perspective” 
(Lysaker / Lysaker 2002, 210). This view also entails “that personal stories are 
smaller in scope, less integrative, and more ephemeral” (McAdams 2008, 102) 
than previously assumed. One can easily see that this view of life stories as dy-
namic, polyphonic, fragmented, and non-linear models of the human mind, im-
plies an approach to narratives that is consistent with that of contemporary nar-
ratology. Narratology, in turn, has a lot to profit from this view as it offers a new 
chance to merge empirical psychological research with the endeavours of post-
classical narratology. 
Our work is part of a cross-faculty cooperation between the Faculty of 
Medicine and the Faculty of Arts at the University of Szeged. A core segment of 
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the work of our research group is a comprehensive linguistic and narrative anal-
ysis of schizophrenic speech, because we understand narrative identity and nar-
rative intelligence as keys to studying and treating this illness. In the following 
section, we will outline our view of schizophrenia and present the most im-
portant problems of personal stories produced by individuals who live with 
schizophrenia. 
3. Narratives and Pathology: Schizophrenic Storytelling 
Schizophrenia is a severe mental illness that affects about one percent of the 
population worldwide. There is no simple test that would yield a diagnosis of 
this illness. It is diagnosed through several symptoms such as delusion, halluci-
nation, incoherent speech, disintegrated or catatonic behaviour, and diminished 
emotional expression. Yet, none of these symptoms are specific to schizophre-
nia. The striking symptoms observable at the time of psychotic phases seem to 
be only highly inconsistent surface phenomena of the illness. Since its core is 
rather difficult to define and its symptoms are very heterogeneous, it is no won-
der that there have been major debates and ambivalences in the history of prog-
noses and treatments of schizophrenia (Hamm et al. 2013, 45). At the same time 
and quite early on, the complexity of the illness was suspected to originate from 
a deficit in the functioning of the fundamental cognitive system behind con-
scious thought. Emil Kraepelin referred to the disorder as a “disunity of con-
sciousness” (Parnas 2003, 220). Eugen Bleuler, one of the illness’ first theorists, 
who coined the term “schizophrenia” in 1911, “suggested that [it] was, in part, 
the result of a disruption in the associative processes needed to synthesize infor-
mation into the kinds of integrated ideas about oneself and others which are 
needed to support complex meaningful human activity” (Lysaker et al. 2015, 
530). 
According to the findings and theories of phenomenological psychiatry, 
which became prominent following the narrative turn in the past few decades, 
“disorders of the Self represent the psychopathological core of schizophrenia” 
(Parnas / Sass 2002, 101). When it comes to the functioning of consciousness, 
it seems that the symptoms of schizophrenia are not rooted in individual aspects 
of consciousness because the essential disorder is not in the functions them-
selves, but in the normally cohesive, harmonic cooperation between them (Min-
kowski, 1926). This is the view of schizophrenia that we would like to contribute 
to with our narrative approach.  
To understand the forms of self-disorders, it is essential to identify the dif-
ferent types of the organization of the self. Within a phenomenological ap-
proach, Josef Parnas has identified three levels: the pre-reflective or minimal, the 
reflective, and the social or narrative self. The pre-reflective level, also referred 
to as the “basic” self or ipseity, “refers to the consciousness of oneself as an im-
mediate subject of experience” (Martin 2014, 1). On the second, “more explicit 
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and complex level, self-awareness is a reflective consciousness of an I as the 
invariant and persisting subject pole of experience and action” (Parnas 2003, 
219). On the most complex level of the organization of the self, it is experienced 
“as having special characteristics, like a personality, and a personal history that 
we tell about ourselves” (Martin 2014, 2). According to this phenomenological 
approach, the essential disorder in schizophrenia is assumed to occur on the 
most basic level of the self: the minimal self. Since the higher levels of the self 
are built on the previous level(s), disorders on the deepest level may be traceable 
on the higher ones, or rather, a peculiar system of compensating mechanisms 
may appear in them. Our assumption is that the effects of the disorder are ob-
servable and potentially treatable on the narrative level of the self. On the other 
hand, it is not unlikely that there are specific disorders on the reflective and nar-
rative levels as well, possibly only in a subgroup of people with schizophrenia.3 
As a working hypothesis, we regard these characteristics as specific to 
schizophrenia. In order to test it, our long-term goal is to simultaneously inves-
tigate the different levels of the organization of the self. A crucial part of this 
endeavour is the investigation of the narrative identity. 
Schizophrenia is known to affect the sense of identity. „Autobiographical 
memory deficits observed in schizophrenia could contribute to this altered sense 
of identity. The ability to give a meaning to personally significant events (mean-
ing making) is also critical for identity construction and self-coherence” (Berna 
2011, 703). Among the symptoms of schizophrenia that are strongly connected 
to narrative identity are the following: less specific memories, impaired social 
adjustment abilities, time processing impairments, weak connections between 
thoughts, and deficits in memory and attention. 
Dimaggio and Semerari investigated the pathologies of narrative function and 
attempted to classify psychopathological narrative forms. The problems of pa-
tients’ narratives can be numerous, but their classification identifies two main 
types of problems: impoverished narratives and integration deficit. Both types 
can occur in schizophrenic narratives. In the case of integration deficit, the nar-
rative itself may be lengthy, but incoherent and disorganized (Dimaggio / Seme-
rari 2001, 5). Impoverished narratives may have a deficit in narrative production, 
or they may be alexithymic narratives, which “do not refer to emotional states, 
do not contain comprehensible descriptions of problems that the therapist 
should tackle, [and] do not take much account of the listener’s perspective” 
(ibid.). It has also been noted that metacognitive deficits are a stable feature of 
schizophrenia (Hamm et al. 2012, 1303). Creating a chronological account of 
their lives is also a difficult task for the patients, since they ultimately [account] 
for life on a moment-to-moment, rather than a historical, basis” 
(Lysaker / Lysaker 2002, 209). Moreover, their ability to access episodic memo-
ries, which are “the most event-specific, most experience-near representations 
in long-term memory” (Conway 2009, 2308), is attenuated (cf. Conway 2005, 
610). 
What is a written representation of a schizophrenic narrative identity like? In 
our experience, what the patients typically produce are very general descriptions 
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of a few stages of their life. Specific memories are only inserted, not embedded, 
in the story, hence its form can be fragmentary. No connections are being made 
between the writer’s specific memory and his or her general living conditions. 
There are also no connections between the given memory and the self,4 even 
when the memory is claimed to be highly significant. Schizophrenic life stories 
usually feature a powerless and introverted protagonist, who is rarely in the po-
sition to make important decisions. One of the patients explained that she always 
prefers to only listen to others, instead of being engaged in a conversation and 
sharing her own stories. In her own life story, she claims that she doesn’t “always 
[have] to play the part of the protagonist, not even in [her] own life”.5 As Hamm 
et al. observe, 
[w]ithin the general context of treatment, the role and relative prominence of psy-
chotherapy has fluctuated significantly across time. At certain points in the last 
century, psychotherapy has been placed as a core treatment modality, while at 
other times it has virtually disappeared. Debates have also ensued regarding what 
psychotherapy for schizophrenia might best entail (2013, 45). 
In psychiatry, the so-called „recovery movement” has postulated for a long time 
now that “recovery is a complex, multidimensional process”, “attaining both 
objective and subjective markers of wellness” (ibid.). Today, there is a wide-
spread “interest in how narrative change or transformation may itself be an in-
tegral part of recovery from mental illness” (Lysaker et al. 2005, 244), and it has 
been suggested that “recovery from schizophrenia may involve the recapturing 
or developing one’s personal narrative” (Lysaker et. al. 2010, 271). So, narrative 
research on schizophrenia is not exactly a new revolutionary path. But a narrative 
group therapy for patients with schizophrenia is almost unprecedented. Consid-
ering our clinical interests, this is the orientation that we would like to contribute 
to by developing our therapy. Our assumption is that the typical deficits in pa-
tients’ stories can be translated into therapeutic techniques. The main techniques 
to be applied concern personal narratives: the narrative restructuring of the pa-
tients’ written autobiographies, and additional practice concerning “small sto-
ries” of everyday conversations where our identities are developed and tested 
(Bamberg 2012). During the sessions, the patients also work with narratological 
phenomena such as perspectivization or embedding. In cooperation with the 
Department of Psychiatry at the University of Szeged, we carried out a pilot 
study with healthy control persons and persons with schizophrenia.  
4. The Dynamic Restructuring of the Life Story  
This section explains our method and elaborates on how to conceptualize life 
stories. Narrative therapies have been rather popular in psychology because the 
ability to coherently tell a detailed life story is undoubtedly connected to psycho-
logical health and well-being. As János László describes, as individuals, we live 
by our own stories, the plots of which are being reconsidered each time a new 
event is added to them; the (narrative) self is not static, not a substance, but the 
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organization of the sum of our personal experiences into a unit which contains 
not only what has happened but also what might happen in the future (2004, 
333). One of the most important ideas that we build our therapy on is Paul H. 
Lysaker’s: 
People with severe mental illness may need to construct and then tell and continue 
to tell their story, deepening that story, re-positioning themselves as people who 
can narrate their own story while making efforts to successfully engage in daily 
life. (2010, 275) 
Our therapy offers techniques for the deepening of the story and for the re-
positioning of the storyteller. As for our method, we have strongly built on James 
Pennebaker’s findings, who investigated the relationship of writing and physical 
and psychological health (cf. 2001). In his experiment, participants had to write 
about personally upsetting topics every day for a course of three to five days. He 
found that the practice of writing down personal experiences has a therapeutic 
effect. He also found that the best results were gained not by those who ex-
pressed their emotions and problems from the start in the most detailed and 
reflective manner, but by those whose texts included a considerable difference 
between the first and the last ones, the latter being more expressive and evalua-
tive. Interestingly, these participants also expressed more negative emotions 
(ibid, 195f.). This is evidence for Pennebaker’s claim that in writing therapies the 
goal should not simply be to achieve a very sophisticated level of expression of 
our experiences, but to enhance a constructive process of restructuring and re-
thinking them. Therefore, while coherence is globally viewed as one of the most 
important structural elements of a healthy personal story, it is important that one 
should not rush into creating a well-structured and detailed personal story at the 
expense of contemplating and revaluating its content (ibid., 201). 
Our therapy has seven sessions, each focusing on important aspects of nar-
rative identity and narrative intelligence, which are impaired in the stories of 
people with schizophrenia. The topics of the seven sessions are: 1. narratives in 
communication and culture: the life story; 2. the dialogical self; 3. integration; 4. 
self-defining memories and meaning-making; 5. emotions and embodiment; 6. 
social cognition; 7. overarching themes and the future. 
Before the sessions begin, each participant is asked to create a short written 
life story. The instructions for this task are based on the method of Dan P. 
McAdams’ Life Story Interview (2009), in which the participant is to imagine his 
or her life story as a novel, divided into four to eight chapters. Each chapter may 
be at least half a page and at most one page long. Each chapter may describe a 
period of one’s life or a single memory of great significance. The only specific 
instruction is that the last chapter should be written about the future. Apart from 
that, the participants are free to decide what to include in their life stories and 
how much to elaborate. During therapy, they are to work on these life stories as 
a homework after each session. The method is nondirective. After discussing the 
given topics during each session, the participants do not get specific instructions 
as to how to rewrite their stories. They are free to decide how the topics of the 
sessions inspire them to rewrite their stories, although consultation is offered to 
them if they need it. As a pilot study, we have done the therapy with four small 
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groups, altogether with nine healthy people and nine patients of the Psychiatry 
Clinic in Szeged, suffering from schizophrenia spectrum disorders. We held two 
sessions per week, the therapy lasting three and a half weeks. 
5. The Topics of the Sessions and their Relevance for the Life 
Stories Created by our Participants 
Session 1: Narratives in Communication and Culture: The Life Story 
The first session sheds light on the functions of stories in our everyday cognitive 
processes and their roles in social and cultural interactions and explains the im-
portance and (changing) nature of life stories. Narratives are everywhere around 
us and in our minds as well, and they influence each other. This is what is meant 
by the claim that narrative “selves [are] constructed concurrently from the inside 
out and outside in” (McLean / Thorne 2006, 117). As for narratological aspects, 
this initial session introduces the most important elements of a story, such as 
characters, events, and plot structure (Herman 2002, 1; Fludernik 2002, 9; Adler 
et al. 2007, 1186). These may seem trivial to discuss, but in the case of impover-
ished narratives, the writer may have difficulties with some of these fundamental 
aspects. For instance, one participant, a 23-year-old man, started his life story 
with his memory of the nursery he attended. The following lines are the very 
beginning of the first version of his story, and also its complete first chapter: 
Nursery 
Here I only remember my stuffed dog and my parents, they are very important. 
It is as if I was sensing the teachers and my peers, feeling that I love them and we 
take care of each other. At this time if I did not have my dog with me, I cried.  
There is no introduction, his memories are generic and without any context – 
for instance, the reader does not learn anything about his family. This character-
izes the rest of his story as well: there is barely any specific memory in it that 
could be called an event or in which actions are described.  
Session 2: The Dialogical Self 
This module is based on Hubert Hemans’s theory of the dialogical self, which 
conceives of the self as an ever-changing set of dialogues, a multiple phenome-
non in and of itself. During this session, we also concentrate on what may be 
called synchronic integration: the integration of the different self-positions into 
one’s self. This approach can be understood as a critique of traditional narrative 
approaches to the life story, because the latter assumes a unified, single narrating 
voice. But while trying to find a single narrative voice in writing for the sake of 
coherence, we may end up disregarding a number of voices and positions of the 
self. Narrative identity is “akin to a polyphonic novel that is authored by many 
different voices within the person, all of whom engage in dialogue with each 
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other and with flesh-and-blood characters in the external world” (McAdams 
2008, 243). Therefore, the application of dialogical self theory may seem like an 
anti-narrative practice, but, in fact, it shows an essential dimension of narratives 
in our cognitive processes. 
One of our participants, a woman in her 40s who lives with schizophrenia, 
struggled a great deal with her text. The first version of her life story was actually 
the opposite of what most patients typically produce. Instead of providing gen-
eral descriptions about some periods of her life, she only recounted 12 specific 
memories. Each of them was told in a separate chapter in a couple of sentences. 
The following is her latest recounted memory: 
12. J’s (my brother’s) wedding: 
It’s September, in 2014. The weather is rainy, the sky is overcast. Today is a big 
day, J. marries G. The family, the friends, the acquaintances have all been prepar-
ing. Chicken plucking, pig and cattle slaughtering. Decorating, setting the tables, 
washing up. The engagement happened two years ago, worrying, everything 
should be in order. The young couple is very pretty, the bride wears purple when 
she greets the guests, the groom is handsome, grey and pink. Lunch, farewell to 
the parents, civil ceremony, church ceremony. The bride wears white, red, as it is 
customary. They are beautiful, young, happy… 
There was no contextualization and not much reference to emotional states ei-
ther. After the second session she added more text, carefully separating them by 
categories (12.1, 12.2, 12.3) 
12.1 Emotional fluctuations:  
Preparing, we’re getting weeks, days closer. Tense atmosphere, excitement, wait-
ing for the guests. Cakes and ale, celebration. Smiling, happy couple. Crying par-
ents. Band, dance, partying. Big day, general happiness. 
12.2 Relationships:  
There are many of us, many acquaintances whom I don’t know well. Extended 
family, a lot of friends. […] The young couple is happy, the parents are moved, 
everyone in the family is anxious whether the guests are having a good time. 
12.3 Family roles:  
The family has a new member. G. fits in the family. We know her, the marriage 
was preceded by a long relationship. She has been a family member before, but 
now she is officially that, too. She became my sister-in-law, she is the new member 
[…]. My younger brother, J’s process of becoming an adult is now, with this event, 
completed […]. 
As in the previous case, the style of this text is characteristic of the writer’s entire 
story. She provides flashes of memories, often in present tense, short sentences, 
lists of nouns or impression-like recounting. Interestingly, she provides strictly 
separated, numbered sections for each memory instead of producing a reworked, 
blended version. This can be understood as a step forward though, as a peculiar 
method of embedding the memory simply by adding more information to it. 
Thinking about the positions of one’s self does not make writing simpler, it may 
actually result in making the representation of the life story more fragmented at 
this stage, but it may potentially deepen its internalized version, the narrative 
identity itself. In the parts that were added later, there are many expressions of 
emotions, as well as references to relationships, which are typically difficult to 
express for individuals with schizophrenia, and of which were much less in the 
first version. The writer is the same person who claimed that she does not always 
have to be the protagonist of her own life. Section 12.3 is an example of her 
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claim: she attempts to explain her self’s position, but she concentrates on the 
newlyweds instead of herself. 
Session 3: Integration 
This session focuses on two different aspects of integration: the integration of 
specific episodes of one’s life, and the integration of the life story into the indi-
vidual’s larger social environment, in the hope of reducing the feeling of isolation 
that persons with schizophrenia often suffer from. From a narratological aspect, 
this session is chiefly concerned with structural issues, the organization of spe-
cific events and their embedding in the life story.  
A woman of 60 who lives with schizophrenia constructed an impoverished 
story, with two distinct methods of narrating. In some chapters, she wrote in 
relatively rich detail, describing generic scenes, typically from her childhood, 
without specific events or actions: 
My grandmother took care of the flowers. My father took care of the animals, my 
grandmother fed the smaller animals: chickens, ducks, etc. My mother took care 
of the house, she cleaned it, cooked, washed and ironed the clothes. My grandfa-
ther had some vines, he made wine. Sometimes he sang to me military songs that 
he had learned during the war. We sewed and played simple card games with my 
grandmother. 
In other chapters, the same person’s story shows a deficit in narrative produc-
tion: 
I consciously chose a specific university because of a profession that had attracted 
me since my childhood. But studying did not go so well at the university as it had 
before. But I finished it and started working in the capital because that is where I 
got a job. It was difficult, with many issues. I met my husband and we moved in 
with his parents. 
Here, the writer provides only a little more than a list of actions, events, and 
circumstances. These are obviously of great importance in her life, but she pro-
vides no details or explanations. For instance, in the first version of her life story 
we cannot tell which profession she had chosen. 
Interestingly, while the first versions that the patients created were mostly quite 
coherent, they had problems integrating episodes that they added to their life 
stories later. These episodes often remained largely isolated from the rest of the 
story, producing evidence for Pennebaker’s idea that people tend to rush into 
creating a firm structure for personal stories, which are later difficult to decon-
struct. Integration seems to be the most problematic aspect of schizophrenic 
storytelling in our findings, and it will need more attention and work during fu-
ture sessions. 
Session 4: Self-Defining Memories and Meaning-Making 
This session concentrates on the ‘building blocks’ of the life story: the most sig-
nificant memories. These are connected to long-term goals or serious conflicts. 
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We also work with the constituent which holds these memories together in a 
flexible construct, and which is described as “the never-ending process of mean-
ing-making” in Jefferson A. Singer’s model of narrative identity (Singer / Blagov 
2013, 570). Meaning-making means the embedding of these memories into the 
life stories by evaluating them and connecting it to the self through explaining 
what its personal significance is. In this regard, this session continues the prob-
lematization of integration. The experiences we had during the third and the 
fourth sessions have shown that the patients often have difficulties finding con-
nections between their experiences and their selves, they often simply fail to put 
into words what a memory content means to them. In fact, in some cases they 
even had problems with understanding what a single specific memory or event 
is. For instance, when asked to share a unique childhood memory they might 
start to speak about how different the school system was when they were young, 
and how carefree they were as children. This might happen even after they have 
heard others sharing proper unique memories. 
Session 5: Emotions and Embodiment 
By embodiment we mean mainly sense perceptions which, together with emo-
tions, facilitate the process of remembering and make memories more specific. 
When we recall certain emotions, perceptions, and their impressions, this recol-
lection helps us to arrive at a more detailed memory and it also helps to evaluate 
and understand it. Although most participants were eager to discuss these phe-
nomena, it turned out that they are often quite difficult to verbalize. When first 
included in the life story, they even tend to deconstruct the structure that existed 
in the story previously. Thus, these contents may also be seen as anti-narrative, 
subversive elements. Moreover, many of the participants initially tried to avoid 
expressing negative emotions out of distrust or to make a better impression, 
although, based on Pennebeker’s findings, they were encouraged to do so. The 
following quote is the representation of a patient’s negative memory:  
It is quite difficult to write about. Head lice appeared in several children’s hair in 
our class. Nurses came and inspected us. Unfortunately, this thing still occurs 
today, one cannot really prevent it. My mother became angry, she became furious. 
I can still feel the pain as I did when she put the medicinal cream on my hair and 
combed it with a fine tooth comb. She ironed my sheets angrily. 
This participant notoriously avoided expressing similar experiences. Therefore, 
when she finally added this memory, it was difficult to embed in her story. It is 
claimed to be an important memory, it is remembered clearly, with sense per-
ceptions and bodily experiences (pain). Yet, as for integration and meaning-mak-
ing, the reader is left without a clear explanation concerning the significance of 
this experience. For example, there are no explicit references to the emotions of 
the writer. Moreover, the very fact that she had head lice, although, it becomes 
obvious, is not stated. 
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Session 6: Narratives and Social Cognition 
Stories as such serve as maps in social spaces (Péley 2013, 150). According to 
Tibor Pólya, social knowledge is first and foremost organized according to nar-
ratives (2004, 341). During this session, we concentrated on perspectivization 
and mentalization. One of the tasks in this session is to recount an important 
memory from the perspective of somebody else, who also shares the given 
memory. These are especially problematic aspects of patient stories. In this ses-
sion, we also focus on orality, that is, the way we build, shape, and rebuild our 
identity in social situations, through interacting with others (cf. Pasupathi 2006, 
144). These are important aspects of narrative identities, since the way we un-
derstand the experiences of others greatly influences who we are and how we 
understand our experiences. As Monisha Pasupathi puts it, “[t]here is a kind of 
dynamic relationship between expressing and creating selves in conversational 
storytelling” (ibid.). Patients’ stories usually feature few characters with little (if 
any) characterization, which reflects the isolation they experience. 
Session 7: Overarching Themes and the Future 
The last session aims at a summary and an evaluation of the previous sessions. 
Here we also call attention to the fact that this is not the closing of the whole 
process of working with one’s life story. This is the first session where we deal 
not only with specific parts and aspects of personal stories but also with the 
representation of the life story as a whole, in the form of overarching themes 
contained in it (cf. Habermas / Silveira 2008, 709). We deal here also with plans 
for the future (cf. László 2004, 333). The previous sessions all contribute to mak-
ing these themes and plans clearer. 
In order to help to discuss and understand the most important themes in the 
participants’ lives one task in this session is to give a title to one’s life story, and 
give a short explanation of it. This task shows the way the participant under-
stands the themes of his or her life. A man in his fifties titled his severely impov-
erished life story “Responsibility”. Firstly, it may seem like a meaningful title 
referring to a personal mission. However, this patient was heavily perseverating:6 
throughout the sessions he kept giving responses that described stereotypical 
proper behaviour. For instance, he frequently claimed “Responsibility is very 
important”, even when it was completely irrelevant to the current topic. There-
fore, the title probably does not have any real personal meaning behind it. A 
young man titled his life story “The prodigal son”. This title does capture an 
important lesson in his life, as it is connected to his greatest regret and most 
important present dilemma (he feels he did not listen to his parents when he was 
younger), therefore it is a personal and meaningful title that could help him gain 
a perspective of his life that will help him in his future. 
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Discussion 
Our experiences with the patients’ and the control persons’ narratives have led 
us to important considerations of life stories. By the end of the therapy, each 
participant has provided seven versions of his or her life story.7 The function of 
this practice is to turn the experience of working with the life story into a habit 
on the participants’ part, while it can potentially also reveal more dimensions of 
the writing process, which is important for the development of the method. 
When it comes to investigating the representations of the narrative identities, 
one needs to take into account each and every one of the seven versions for each 
participant, since during the rewriting process the writers are free to remove any 
part that was previously written, therefore there may be important parts that are 
deleted from the final version.8 Nonetheless, the most important aspect is the 
inner version of the life story, to which we do not have direct access, and which 
differs considerably from its representations in many respects – most im-
portantly, it does not even exist in the form of an encompassing, unified story, 
not even temporarily. We claim that the difficulties of the attempt to create a 
representation of it reveal some crucial aspects of the life story. 
This leads us to a partly new concept of the narrative self as well as to im-
portant insights about narrative forms and functions in mental processes, since 
the therapy can be regarded as a practice in which the process of the construction 
of narratives itself is deconstructed. The method breaks the life story writing 
down into different processes (sometimes in conflict with each other), through 
which we may be able to better understand the complexity and multiplicity of 
narratives in human cognition. An interesting finding was that regarding the dif-
ficulties of the process rewriting, we can assume that the life story is not entirely 
a verbal phenomenon, which is lucidly expressed by a question Nóra Pintér pro-
poses: “Am I only what I can put into words?” (2012, 69). When we included 
anti-narrative elements9 among the topics of the sessions, our intention was not 
to undermine narrative construction but to shed light on the fact that not all 
aspects of a life story can be expressed verbally, or at least not to the same extent. 
We believe our experiments have also sufficiently demonstrated that this un-
derstanding is in line with the way how neuropsychology explains the formation 
of episodic memories. According to Martin A. Conway, episodic memories con-
sist of so-called episodic elements, which he regards as “the fundamental units 
of the cognitive system as a whole” (2009, 2311). The episodic elements are 
“non-verbal and sensory-perceptual in nature”, and they are to be understood as 
the basis of all conceptual knowledge, since the autobiographical knowledge 
base, which is also built on these elements, is always, at least partially, active in 
the brain (Conway 2015, 575). We have observed several instances of the con-
stitutive power of these episodic elements in the writings of our participants. 
Single, detailed memories as well as impressions were often added in the rewrit-
ings, and they usually appeared without previous contextualization. Hence these 
parts, when newly added, potentially subverted a previously existing narrative 
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structure. But the participants usually understood the newly formed, more frag-
mented and chaotic narrative as a step forward compared to previous retellings, 
perhaps as a temporary state between the ‘outdated’ structure and a new, more 
appropriate one.  
This might help us rethink the roles and workings of narratives in human 
cognition. Ralf Schneider has recently outlined the possibilities and risks of in-
tegrating neurosciences with narratology (cf. 2017), for which the examination 
of stories created by people with mental illnesses may also be fruitful. Certain 
aspects of embodiment have become significant in cognitive science, and lately 
they have gained importance in narratology, for instance in second generation 
cognitive narratology. We were pleased to realize that our findings concur with 
the theory of Richard Walsh, who claims that “narrative always functions inter-
dependently with other modes of cognition” (2017, 461). As he explains, “nar-
rative discourse may foreground narrative meaning, but […] [in and of itself] 
[n]arrative sense-making is partial, provisional, and interdependent with other 
modes of sense-making” (ibid., 473f.). These further modes “would appear to 
be more fundamental and more primitive than language, initially bound up with 
the emergence of consciousness, and a primary determinant of the parameters 
of any conceivable system of values” (ibid., 473). This view of narrative under-
standing is in line with the phenomenological model of the narrative self, which 
emerges from and which is influenced by ‘lower’ levels of the self and conscious-
ness. Although our present research is in its early phase, our findings appear to 
support the above-mentioned premises held by cognitive narratology, experi-
mental cognitive sciences, and psychology. 
In the future, we plan to place more emphasis on specific memories and their 
embedding in the life story to reduce the patients’ overly general descriptions. 
We also plan to introduce more exercises with perspective and shifting points of 
view, because this strategy is one of the most important narratological phenom-
ena. It also has great significance for psychological health, and patients typically 
struggle with tasks involving these strategies. These changes will also allow us to 
learn more about narrative phenomena in the narratives of people with mental 
illnesses. We plan to have more sessions, because the longer the therapy is, the 
greater chance we have that the patients acquire new storytelling skills. Last but 
not least, to our experience it is on the basis of themes that patients naturally 
tend to add new parts to their life stories,10 rather than rewriting them according 
to principles concerning structural phenomena. Thus, we assume that the rewrit-
ing procedure is to be structured around thematic issues (possibly around self-
positions suggested by the theory of the dialogical self, such as ‘being a daughter’ 
or ‘being a spouse’), and the problematization of narratological phenomena is to 
be conveyed through the discussion of the contents of the life story, indirectly. 
Introducing these changes will probably result in the production of even longer 
texts, which are easier to restructure for the participants and which become a 
richer source for the investigation of single narratological phenomena. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have outlined a section of the work of our research group at 
the University of Szeged, which investigates schizophrenia in a cooperation be-
tween the Department of Psychiatry and the Faculty of Arts. Merging psychol-
ogy, phenomenological psychiatry, and literary theory with a focus on narrative 
intelligence and narrative identity, we have developed a narrative group therapy 
that aims at recovering several skills which are impaired in schizophrenic story-
telling. While narrative theories are widely known in several disciplines, the co-
operation between literary narratology and other fields is far from ideal, due to 
the lack of genuine dialogue. One of our aims is to carry out truly 
interdisciplinary work in the project. We have focused on the methodology of 
the therapy, and the potential that this research and practice may hold for the 
study of narratives. Our therapy targets specific essential aspects of storytelling 
in general, and the life story in particular. This method may contribute to the 
process of recovery from schizophrenia. We have also carried out a pilot study 
with healthy participants as well as patients struggling with schizophrenia spec-
trum disorders.  
While we are still in an early stage of our work, we can conclude that the 
method seems to be fruitful. The participants’ texts are excellent material for 
narrative research, both for psychological and narratological analysis. So far, they 
have shown that we need to adopt a more dynamic, plural, multimedial view of 
personal stories, some essential parts of which are, in fact, of a subversive, anti-
narrative nature. This suggests that several processes of narrative construction 
and comprehension may challenge the views we now hold. Further analysis of 
the texts created and re-created by the patients can contribute to a more com-
prehensive view of the life story, as well as narratives in human mental processes, 
by offering a chance to re-examine the relationship of storytelling, memory, con-
sciousness, and meaning-making. 
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2 We use the term ‘narrative studies’ in accordance with Ansgar Nünning to refer to the use of 
narrative theory and practice in the broadest sense (Nünning 2003, 258). 
3 Among patients with the same diagnosis regarding their cognitive disorders, two subgroups 
were identified (Szendi et al. 2010). 
4 As in ‘Due to this event I have learned to be more patient with others’. 
5 Our participants wrote in Hungarian. The quotes were translated by Lilla Farmasi. 
6 Persisting at tasks despite the behaviour being dysfunctional, due to being unable to adapt to a 
changing social context. 
7 After creating a new version as homework following each session. 
8 One of our healthy participants, a woman in her late 20s, wrote a chapter of a two-year-old 
phase in her life when she had a serious illness. Through a meticulous restructuring process, in 
the sixth version of her life story she gradually replaced the memory itself (of the symptoms, the 
diagnosis, and the treatment) with an equally long piece of writing about the significance of this 
memory. 
9 Such as the multiple, simultaneously existing self positions which are usually excluded from 
autobiographies by one unified narrating voice; or the detailed descriptions of embodied expe-
riences which are in opposition with a view that focuses on events. 
10 For instance, writing about their career in one sitting and writing about their family in another. 
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